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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent, 
vs. 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT ·OF THE CASE 
Milda Hopkins Ashdown, at Cedar City, Iron County, 
Utah, on the 5th day of July A. D., 1955, murdered her 
husband, Ray Ashdown, by administering to him strychnine 
poison; was ·charged with murder in the first degre~ and 
found ·guilty by a jury of her peers who recommended life 
imprisonment as punishment and not the death sentence. 
The Fifth Judicial District Court, Honorable Will L. 
Hoyt, Judge, imposed sentence in accordance with the 
verdict and the recommendation of the jury .. 
Through counsel, defendant prosecutes this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
We shall adopt the appellant's Statement of the Facts 
but for the purpose of continuity in the presentation of 
respondent's argument and authorities, the facts will be 
further and more fully developed under the points herein-
after set forth. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE LAW AND THE EVIDENCE SUPPORT 
THE VERDICT. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS NO COERCION, DURESS OR 
PROMISE OF IMMUNITY MADE TO THE 
DEFENDANT NOR WAS THERE A VIOLA-
TION OF ANY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF 
THE DEFENDANT AND THE COURT WAS 
CORRECT IN SO FINDING. 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS TO THE 
OFFICERS PRIOR TO HER ARREST AND 
PRIOR TO HER REQUEST FOR COUNSEL 
WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED IN EVI-
DENCE. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE GIVING 
OF INSTRUCTION NO. 6. 
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THE LAW AND THE EVIDENCE SUPPORT 
THE VERDICT. 
It is the appellant's contention that:-
"Aside from the oral admissions made by the 
defendant during the questioning by the officers, 
there was no other evidence in the record connecting 
the defendant with the crime." 
The State thinks otherwise. 
Dr. R. G. Williams testified to the following conversa-
tion had with Ray Ashdown just before the said Ray Ash-
down died: 
"* * * And I said : 'Ray have you taken 
anything poison?' And he said 'No.' I said : 'Have 
you eaten anything spoiled?' He said 'No.' I said : 
'Were you well this morning when you got up?' He 
said : 'Yes.' I said : 'When did you get sick?' And 
he said: 'A little while ago.' I said: 'Haven't you 
drunk anything or eaten anything?' He said: 'I 
had some lemonade about half hour ago.' " 
* * * * * 
"* * * He said: 'I had some lemon JUice 
about a half hour ago.' And I said: 'How did it 
taste, Ray?' And he started into another convulsion, 
and he said, 'Doc, it tasted bitter'" (R. 23). 
The defendant had told the witness Gloria Jean Barnhurst 
that her husband hadn't felt well since his breakfast (R. 
18). 
We would contend that the defendant in fact knew 
that her husband had taken, internally, strychnine; other-
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wise, why did she administer to him two or three glasse·s 
of salt water in the hope that it would act as an emetic (R. 
29). The State conclusively proved that the stomach of 
Ray Ashdown and the contents thereof contained strych-
nine, (R. 47) of an "appreciable" amount (R. 54). Mrs. 
Ashdown told Sheriff Nelson, freely and voluntarily on the 
day of the murder and before the interrogation of which 
defendant now complains, that she gave her husband a cup 
of Iemond juice (R. 70) ; that was the aluminum cup with 
a red ring around the top of it which was: 
"* * * setting on the top of the rest of the 
dishes turned upside down. 
"Q. Tell us whether or not the dishes had been 
washed, Mr. Nelson. 
"A. I didn't think they had. 
"Q. In relation to this cup you spoke about, 
had it been washed? 
"A. Yes, the cup was clean" (R. 68). 
We would claim for this cup and its cleansed condition 
something more than a mere coincidence; we would claim 
that the washing of the cup, when done, in and of itself, 
was. sufficient to cast a grave suspicion upon the defendant. 
On July 9th, during the questioning of the defendant, 
at the start thereof and before any confession, Mrs. Ash-
down related the facts about the cup, saying: 
"Q. And after that, sheriff, who spoke and 
what was said? 
"A. I believe that we asked her-I don't know 
whether I asked her or someone else at that time, I 
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believe it was me though that asked her-if Ray 
drank all of the lemon juice that was in the cup. 
"Q. And what was the answer? 
"A. She said no, he didn't drink it all. And 
I asked her what became of what was left. And she 
said that she threw the lemon juice out of the back 
door? 
"Q. Did she tell you what she did with the cup 
after she threw the lemon juice out of the back 
door? 
"A. Yes. She said that she washed the cup 
and set it on top of the dish pan. 
"Q. Did she tell you when in relation to the 
death of Ray Ashdown she threw the lemon juice 
out the back door and washed the cup? 
"A. I asked her when she washed the cup. 
"Q. And what was the answer? 
"A. I asked her. She said 'I washed the cup 
after I had made the second telephone call.' I said 
to her, I said 'Well, that sounds pretty funny, Mrs. 
Ashdown, that you would stop and wash a cup while 
your husband was taking convulsions.' I says 'Can 
you tell us the reason for that?' She says, 'No, I 
can't.' A little later on she says 'I guess I was 
excited' " (R. 75, 76). 
On the 27th day of July, 1955, at the defendant's 
arraignment, when entering her plea of not guilty, the 
defendant said : 
"I am not guilty, not guilty. I didn't mean to 
do it" (R. 102). 
The court ruled this last statement inadmissible as evidence 
against the defendant and the statement was not offered 
as evidence in the presence of the jury (R. 154). 
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POINT II 
THERE WAS NO COERCION, DURESS OR 
PROMISE OF IMMUNITY MADE TO THE 
DEFENDANT NOR WAS THERE A VIOLA-
TION OF ANY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF 
THE DEFENDANT AND THE COURT WAS 
CORRECT IN SO FINDING. 
The trial of this cause commenced at 10:00 o'clock a.m., 
on August 22, 1955; the selection of a jury was completed 
and court recessed at 5 :00 p. m. of said day. At 10 :00 
a.m. of the following day, August 23, 1955, the actual trial 
commenced (R. 1, 2, 3). 
The State called the witness Martha Turnbaugh who 
testified that she was acquainted with the deceased, Ray 
Ashdown, and that she saw him alive in his back dooryard 
on July 5th, 1955 (R. 4, 5, 6). 
The second witness for the State was one Mrs. Pat 
Sorenson, a neighbor of the Ashdowns. This witness testi-
fied (1) as to the defendant's having used the telephone at 
the home of the witness on the morning of July 5th, 1955 
and of circumstances connected therewith ; ( 2) as to a visit 
to the Ashdown home on the afternoon of that July 5th, 
to give condolences; (3) as to what this witness observed 
pertaining to the physical appearance of the defendant on 
these occasions (R. 6 to 13). 
Next, the State called one Gloria Jean Barnhurst, an-
other neighbor of the Ashdowns. The witness testified 
generally: ( 1) That she saw the defendant in the morning 
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of July 5th, 1955; (2) that the defendant used the witness's 
telephone to call a doctor ; ( 3) that the defendant returned 
to the home of the witness almost immediately after having 
left from the first visit; ( 4) that the defendant was real 
upset; ( 5) that the witness and the defendant commenced 
certain preparation to take the defendant's husband to the 
hospital but that before they could do so, the doctor arrived; 
(6) that the defendant said her husband had not felt well 
since his breakfast; that he was in a lot of pain and was 
going paralyzed from his waist down (R. 13 to 20). 
Dr. R. G. Williams was the next witness called by the 
State. The doctor testified as to his attendance of the de\oo 
ceased at the home of the deceased and the defendant on 
the morning of July 5th, 1955, and as to the death of the 
deceased thereat; as to arranging for a coroner's jury; as 
to the performance of an autopsy on the body of the de-
ceased; as to the preparation of specimens for examination 
by the State Chemist; and, on cross-examination, as to 
some of the things defendant said to him during his attend-
ing the deceased and as to the physical and mental state 
of the defendant at such time. The doctor was interrogated 
as to his diagnosis of strychnine poisoning as the cause 
of death; and, as to other toxins which also affect the 
central nervous system ( R. 20 to 36) . 
Arch Benson, Deputy Sheriff of Iron County, then 
related the method and means by which the specimens 
taken from the body of the deceased by Dr. Williams. were 
delivered to the State Chemist at Salt Lake City for analysis 
(R. 37, 38, 39). 
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The State Chemist, M. Elmer Christensen, then testi-
fied for the State concerning the results of his findings 
from an examination of the said specimens; that the con-
tents of the stomach of the deceased contained strychnine 
(R. 37 to 59). 
Deputy Sheriff Arch Benson on re-direct examination 
related the return of the specimens with the report of the 
State Chemist to Cedar City (R. 59, 60). 
Dr. R. G. Williams was recalled to identify the State's 
Exhibits 1 and 2 which were later admitted without objec-
tion by the defense (R. 60, 61, 62 and 187). On cross ... exam-
ination, the doctor was further interrogated as to the 
autopsy findings and as to the presence of alcohol in the 
stomach of the deceased (R. 62, 63, 64). 
The State then called Sheriff Arthur Nelson as a wit-
ness (R. 65). The sheriff testified as to his activities on 
the day of the murder and in connection therewith; i. e., 
July 5, 1955 (R. 65 to 68). Then the Record shows the 
following as having taken place: 
"Q. Now, Mr. Nelson, I call your attention to 
the afternoon of the 5th of July 1955, did you 
have occasion to return to the Ashdown home? 
"A. Well, we went up to the Ashdown home. 
"Q. Who do you mean? Who was with you? 
"A. Myself and Arch Benson, deputy sheriff, 
Charles Wells, Deputy Sheriff, and A. M. Marsden, 
county attorney. 
"Q. When you got to the Ashdown home, what 
did you do? 
"A. Well, there was Mrs. Ashdown was-
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"Q. Mrs. Ashdown? 
"A. Mrs. Ashdown was out in the back of the 
house. We drove up to the yard and got out of the 
automobile and shook hands with Mrs. Ashdown, 
and talked to her a second or two and then I asked 
her if she would mind getting in the car, that we 
would like to talk to her. 
"Q. And what happened? 
"A. And she did get in the car with us. 
"Q. Who was present if you recall at this 
time? 
"A. The same group, A. M. Marsden, Wells, 
Benson, and myself. 
"Q. And Mrs. Ashdown? 
"A. And Mrs. Ashdown. 
"Q. Will you tell us if you can who spoke and 
what was said, as nearly as you can remember? 
"A. As near as I remember I started the con-
versation. I think I said to Mrs. Ashdown that we 
would like to talk to her a little about the case, and 
I asked her if she knew really what happened. She 
said no she didn't know what had happened. I said 
to her, 'WeU, Mrs. Ashdown, Dr. Williams seems to 
think that Ray has been poisoned or had some poi-
son.' 'Well,' she says, 'I didn't do it. I wouldn't 
even poison a rat.' 
"MR. ERICKSON: Just a minute, your Honor. 
"THE COURT: We will take a short recess. 
"(3 :15 p. m. Jurors admonished by the Court. 
Recess)" (R. 68 and 69). 
Thereafter at 3:55 p. m., the court re-convened in the ab-
sence of the jury. 
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Without the presence of the jury, the following wit-
nesses were examined before the court. 
[For the State] 
Arthur Nelson, Sheriff (R. 69-100). 
Charles Wells, Deputy Sheriff (R. 100-102). 
[For the Defendant] 
John Walter Segler (R. 103-111). 
Milda Hopkins Ashdown, Defendant (R. 111-
113). 
William Henry Hopkins (R. 113-116). 
Objections were then made to the admission of the written 
confession of the defendant (R. 118, 119). The court took 
the matter under advisement and recessed, 5 :45 p. m., until 
August 24th, 1955. 
August 24th, 1955, at 10:00 a. m., the Court re-con-
vened in the absence of the jury. 
The State called as witness: 
Charles Wells, Deputy Sheriff (R. 120-140). 
The Court called as witness: 
Patrick H. Fenton, District Attorney (R. 143-
148). 
Thereafter the court recessed at 11:45 a. m., August 24th, 
1955. 
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The court re-convened at 2:00 p. m., in the absence of 
the jury, and from the testimony taken (R. 69 through 
148) made the following statement of its findings: 
"THE COURT: Regarding the question of 
whether the prosecution can go into the evidence 
which has been testified to by the Sheriff Arthur 
Nelson and by Deputy Wells and Mr. Fenton, the 
court wishes to make the following statement of its 
findings: 
"First, that there was no promise made or 
assurance given of any immunity from prosecution. 
"Second, the court finds that the defendant was 
advised before the statements that are sought to be 
introduced in evidence were made; that she had the 
right to refuse to answer questions or make a state·-
ment and that she had the right to have an attorney. 
"Third, that the defendant did not at that time 
ask for an attorney, nor until after the statements 
offered were made, except as to certain statements 
made in answer to questions as to where she pro-
cured the strychnine, which questions were asked 
and answers made after she indicated that she 
should have or desired to have an attorney. 
"Fourth, that the defendant was questioned or 
interviewed by Sheriff Nelson and Deputy Wells 
and the District Attorney from approximately 4 :00 
p. m. until approximately 8:30 p. m. before she 
made the statements that are under question here; 
that she was then in the courtroom in the presence 
of those three officers, two peace officers and the 
District Attorney, and that her sister, although she 
came with her to the sheriff's office, wasn't per-
mitted to go into the room, nor was her father or 
her uncle permitted to go into the courtroom during 
the course of that questioning. 
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"The court finds that there were no threats of 
violence or other threats made by either of the offi-
cers or by the District Attorney. 
"Sixth, that there was no promise made nor 
any assurance given of any benefit or reward, ex-
cept that the District Attorney informed the de-
fendant that if poison had been given by mistake it 
might make a difference between a prosecution for 
murder and manslaughter, and the District Attorney 
read to the defendant the statute relating to first 
degree murder and involuntary manslaughter, and 
informed the defendant of the penalties for those 
respective offenses. 
"The court believes that neither the method of 
questioning of the defendant under the circumstances 
shown by the evidence, nor the physical or mental 
distress suffered by the defendant under the cir-
cumstances shown by the evidence were severe 
enough to amount to compulsion as that is contem-
plated by the constitutional provisions or statutes 
which provide that a person shall not be compelled 
to give evidence against himself. 
"The court believes that the circumstances were 
not such as to induce the defendant to make the 
statements in question herein, that is such serious 
statements as the statement that she had furnished 
or given strychnine to her husband. 
"The court believes that the inducing cause of 
the statement was not fear nor duress, nor compul-
sion, nor any promise or assurance of any reward 
or immunity. The court concludes that the state-
ments made by the defendant to the officers after 
she stated that she desired or should have counsel 
are not admissable; that any inquiry as to those 
statements should not be made in the presence of 
the jury. 
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"The court believes that the statements made 
to the officers prior to that time are admissible, but 
the court proposes to give to the jury an appropri-
ate instruction as to its consideration of the weight 
and credibility of such statements. Counsel may 
proceed accordingly" (R. 150-152). 
Thereafter the record shows, as follows: 
"MR. FENTON: Before the jury comes in I 
wonder if the court would indicate if the ruling is 
intended to cover the acts of the 1Oth of July also, 
in which the written confession was solicited. 
"THE COURT: Yes. The court believes that 
under the conclusion just stated that Exhibit 3 
would be admissible in evidence on a proper founda-
tion being laid in the presence of the jury, as was 
laid in the absence of the jury before the court. 
"MR. MARSDEN : That would be admissible? 
"THE COURT: vVill be admissible if a proper 
foundation is laid. 
"MR. MARSDEN: All right. 
"T'HE COURT: In other words, the court does 
not believe that the fact that the written confession 
was signed while the defendant was incarcerated-
no, just a minute. No, that would be after she had 
requested counsel. 
"MR. FENTON: That is correct. 
"THE COURT: That that would be inadmis-
sible under the same principle as the other state-
ments, because of having been procured after she 
had indicated that she desired to have counsel. 
"MR. FENTON: All right, sir. 
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"THE COURT: Any statement by the defen-
dant after that would be subject to objection and 
the State should carefully refrain from going into 
that in the presence of the jury. 
"The court requests that counsel use care to 
avoid any reference to those things that are excluded 
under the present ruling of the court. Anything fur-
ther before we call the jury? 
"MR. FENTON: If I understand correctly 
then, your Honor, we are to be permitted in relation 
to the 9th, up to the time Mrs. Ashdown asked for 
counsel, and at that time be cut off and nothing 
after, that anything up to that time is admissible. 
"THE COURT: Of course you will have to de-
velop it by laying the proper foundation in your 
questioning before the jury. 
"MR. FENTON: Yes, your Honor. 
"THE COURT: You can't admit it to the jury 
without appropriate questioning. 
"MR. FENTON : Yes. 
"THE COURT: And the court requests that 
you avoid leading questions in the presence of the 
JUry. 
"MR. FENTON: Yes, your Honor. 
"THE COURT: One more thing, the court rules 
that the testimony of Mr. Wells regarding what the 
defendant said at the time of her arraignment be-
fore this court is not admissible before the jury and 
should not be referred to. 
"The court believes that the statement made at 
the time the defendant was called upon to enter a 
plea should not be admitted as evidence against her. 
"You will call the jury" (R. 151-154). 
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The finding of the trial court as to the admissibility 
of the evidence is fully substantiated by the Record. Mere 
excerpts from the Record could not suffice to apprise this 
Court of the facts upon which the court below based its 
decision; a reading of the record will show substantial 
evidence from which that court could reasonably find as 
it did. 
We have carefully and fully examined the testimony 
adduced without the presence of the jury and we can only 
conclude that the facts as recorded clearly sustain the find-
ings of the court, in that: 
First: There was no promise made or assurance given 
the defendant of any immunity from prosecution. 
Second: The defendant was advised of her c·onstitu-
tional rights. 
Third: There were no threats of violence or other 
threats, no promise or assurance given of any benefit or 
reward; and 
Fourth: Neither the method of questioning nor the 
physical or mental distress suffered by the defendant were, 
under the circumstances shown by the evidence, severe 
enough to constitute the abridgement of any cDnstitutional 
guarantee of due process of law. 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS TO THE 
OFFICERS PRIOR TO HER ARREST AND 
PRIOR TO HER REQUEST FOR COUNSEL 
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WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED IN EVI-
DENCE. 
The Court below refused to admit in evidence the 
written confession of the defendant upon the ground that 
the defendant had executed the said confession after hav-
ing made a request for counsel and for no other reason. 
The Court found that the defendant's oral confession made 
during the interrogation between 4:00p.m. and 8:30p.m. 
on July 9th was freely and voluntarily made. 
At 2 :25 p. m. on August 24, 1955, the trial resumed 
in the presence of the jury. Sheriff Arthur Nelson resumed 
the witness stand: 
"Q. Mr. Nelson, do you remember where you 
were with your testimony when the jury was ex-
cluded yesterday afternoon? 
"A. I believe it was where Mrs. Ashdown had 
said that she didn't do it, 'I wouldn't even poison a 
rat' " (R. 154). 
The sheriff then related what had been said about the 
deceased's insurance policy; (R. 155) thereafter, the sher-
iff's testimony concerned the interview had with the de-
fendant on July 9th, in the courtroom, prior to her arrest 
and before the defendant asked for counsel (R. 156 to 163). 
Twice within the past two years the United States 
Supreme Court has re-affirmed its rule of long standing 
that courts are not bound to exclude a confession because 
it was obtained during unla 'vful detention or in the absence 
of counsel. Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 476, 73 Sup. Ct. 
347, 417; 97 L. Ed. 469, 499 (Feb. 9, 1953) ; Stein v. People 
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of the State of New York, 346 U. S. 156, 187, 188; 97 L. 
Ed. 1522, 1544; 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1094 (June 15, 1953). 
Our Honorable Court has said : 
"* * * 'The mere questioning of a suspect 
while in the custody of police officers is not prohib-
ited either as a matter of common law or due pro-
cess', and the mere fact that a confession is made 
while the accused is in the custody of the police 
officers does not render it inadmissible." 
"* * * We have found no case which holds 
that a confession is not admissible in evidence 
merely because the defendant was immature and 
without the advice of counsel, friends or relatives 
when it was made and Mares v. Hill, supra, consid-
ered this very problem and held that those facts 
did not make the confession inadmissible in evi-
dence." 
State v. Braasch, et al., 119 Utah 450, 229 P. 
2d 289. 
Deputy Sheriff Charles Wells was called as a witness 
for the State (R. 154) and testified as to the happenings 
at the Ashdown residence on July 5th and to the interro-
gation of the defendant at the Courthouse on July 9th (R. 
154 to 172). 
Sheriff Nelson was recalled by the defense and ques-
tioned as to whether or not the use of a lie detector was 
discussed during the questioning of the defendant on July 
9th; (R. 183) the sheriff said that the use of the instrument 
was not mentioned. 
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Deputy Wells was recalled by the defense (R. 184) 
and corroborated the testimony of the sheriff as to the lie 
detector. 
The State rested : The defense rested. 
If the ultimate quest in a criminal trial is the truth, 
society should not be deprived of the suspect's help in solv-
ing a crime merely because he was confined and questioned 
when uncounseled. When murders are unwitnessed and 
when the only positive knowledge on which a solution can 
be based is peculiarly within the possession of the killer, 
voluntary and uncoerced confessions, because they are true, 
ought not to be excluded for the reason had the defendant 
counsel he would have refrained, possibly even against 
his will, from making any statement. If this is not true, 
then: 
"The people of this country must discipline 
themselves to seeing their police stand by helplessly 
while those suspected of murder prowl about unmo-
lested." 
So said the United States Supreme Court, speaking through 
Mr. Justice Jackson, Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 93 L. 
Ed. 1801, 69 Sup. Ct. 1347. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE GIVING 
OF INSTRUCTION NO. 6. 
Instruction Number 6: 
"In this case there has been testimony that 
on two occasions the defendant was questioned or 
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interviewed in the presence of the sheriff and other 
officers and that she made certain statements in 
answer to questions. Referring to such alleged state-
ments, you are instructed to consider carefully all 
the surrounding circumstances including the events 
of the day and the experiences of the defendant dur-
ing the day and days immediately preceding. You 
should consider the attitude and conduct of the 
officers mentioned, their statements to the defen-
dant, and whether any threats were made or any 
promises, either express or implied, of immunity 
from prosecution, or whether any assurance was 
given of any benefit or reward to the defendant if 
she made a statement. You should also consider the 
length of time covered by the questioning and 
whether the circumstances show any coercion or 
compulsion or any physical or mental strain or suf-
fering or fear or hysteria on the part of the defen-
dant during the time. After giving due considera-
tion to all the surrounding circumstances, you should 
determine whether the alleged statements were made 
by the defendant, and if so, whether such statements 
or any of them are entitled to be believed and if so 
to what extent. You are the exclusive judges of the 
credibility of such statements and the weight to be 
given to them if you believe that any such state-
ments were made" (R. 194, 195). 
The instruction was proper. The question of whether or 
not the statements made by the defendant to the officers 
were voluntary was for the court; the credibility of the 
statements, as well as the weight to be given them, was 
within the exclusive province of the jury. The jurors were 
told that they could entirely disregard the statements made 
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by the tl~fertdnnt at any time ih the presence of the sheriff 
and other officers : 
''* * * if you [do hot] believe that any such 
statements w·ere made. * * *;, 
(Instruction No. 6, supra, [do not] inserted.) 
For, this is what the sentence says: "If you believe that. 
any such statements were made, you are the exclusive 
judges of the credibility of such statements and the weight. 
to be given them." 
The rule in this State is that the jury cannot determine 
the "competency" of a confession. The justices placed that 
very limitations upon the decision of Mt. Justice Larson in 
the case of State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P. 2d 178, 
196. Mr. Justice Wade understood the main opinion in 
'State v. Crank, supra, to so hold; Chief Justice Wolfe and 
Mr. Justice McDonough concurring. Mr. Justice Wade said: 
"* * * We agree with the rule approved in 
those cases, that a confession is not admissible in 
evidence unless it was voluntarily made; that this 
question must be determined by the court from all 
of the evidence from both sides bearing thereon; 
that if the court is satisfied from the evidence that. 
the confession was voluntary, then the court admits 
the confession in evidence to the jury, together with 
all of the evidence on the question of whether it was 
voluntary, and the circumstances surrounding its 
being made, and from such evidence the jury must 
determine the weight and credibility to be given it, 
but may not determine its competency as evidenc~ 
that being a question for the court. * * * Utah 
cases which hold contrary should be expressly over-
ruled." 
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This Court reiterated its rtd~ in State v. Mares, 118 Utah 
484, 192 P. 2d 861, 870. In State v. Braasch, et al., supra, 
the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Wade, said: 
"On the trial the state offered the confessions, 
the court excluded the jury and took evidence and 
therefrom concluded that they were voluntary and 
admissible. The same evidence was submitted to the 
jury with the instruction that, if the jury found 
that the confessions were ~procured through coer-
cion, threats, duress or any promise of immunity or 
benefit' they should be disregarded entirely. Such 
instruction is contrary to our holding in State v. 
Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P. 2d 178, 170 A. L. R. 
542 (concurring opinion at 371 to 375, Utah Reports 
and 195 to 197 Pacific Reporter, agreed to by a 
majority of the court). There we held that a con-
fession should not be admitted until the court was 
convinced that it was made voluntarily which 
usually should be determined in the absence of the 
jury; that if the court decided it was admissible the 
jury should not be required to determine that ques-
tion again but should hear all the evidence on 
whether it was made voluntarily and other evidence 
affecting its credibility with instructions to give 
the confession such weight as they concluded it was 
entitled to but not allo~v them to pass on its admis-
sibility" (229 P. 2d 291). (Emphasis. added.) 
Appellant's objection to Instruction No. 6 is without merit; 
there is no reason her to distinguish between a written or 
an oral confession. 
The court below did not err in denying appellant's 
motion for acquittal. 
The court below did not err in denying appellant's 
motion for new trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
In Stein v. New York, supra, the late Justice Robert 
M. Jackson said : 
"We are not willing to discredit constitutional 
doctrines for protection of the innocent by making 
of them mere technical loopholes for the escape of 
the guilty * * *. The people of the state are 
also entitled to due process of law." 
This conviction should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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